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As citizens around the world become ever more reluctant to respond to survey interview requests, 
incentives are playing an increasingly important role in maintaining response rates.  In face-to-face 
surveys, interviewers are the key conduit of information about the existence and level of any incentive 
offered and, therefore, potentially moderate the effectiveness with which an incentive translates non-
productive addresses into interviews.  Yet, while the existing literature on the effects of incentives on 
response rates is substantial, little is currently known about the role of interviewers in determining 
whether or not incentives are effective. In this paper, we apply multilevel models to three different 
face-to-face interview surveys from the UK, which vary in their sample designs and incentive levels, to 
assess whether some interviewers are more successful than others in using incentives to leverage 
cooperation. Additionally, we link the response outcome data to measures of interviewer 
characteristics to investigate whether interviewer variability on this dimension is systematically 
related to level of experience and demographic characteristics.  Our results show significant and 
substantial variability between interviewers in the effectiveness of monetary incentives on the 
probability of cooperation across all three surveys. However, none of the interviewer characteristics 




It is widely acknowledged that low and declining response rates pose an existential threat to 
conventional approaches to data collection in survey research (Brick & Williams, 2013; Couper, 2013; 
Meyer, Mok, & Sullivan, 2015; Miller, 2017). In response to this pressing challenge, survey 
methodologists have invested considerable time and resources investigating features of the survey 
process which can be leveraged to increase the probability of cooperation amongst sampled units 
(Groves & Couper, 1998; Groves & Heeringa, 2006).  As the primary interface between survey 
organisations and sample members, interviewers are key to this endeavour (Campanelli, Sturgis, & 
Purdon, 1997; Morton-Williams, 1993; West & Blom, 2017). They are the main reason that response 
rates for household interview surveys remain substantially higher than all other available modes, 
albeit that they also come at a commensurately higher cost. A large number of studies in a broad 
range of contexts have now established that demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural differences 
between interviewers can account for substantial variability in response rates (Hansen 2006; Hox and 
Durrant et al. 2010; de Leeuw 2002). For example, Campanelli and O’Muircheartaigh ( 1999) found 
that more experienced interviewers were more successful at obtaining contact and cooperation, due 
to more effective calling patterns and an ability to tailor the survey request to sample members’ 
motivations and concerns.  
In addition to interviewers, monetary incentives of various kinds have played a central role in 
strategies for maximising survey cooperation (Singer, 2002; Singer, Groves, & Corning, 1999; Singer, 
Hoewyk, Gebler, Raghunathan, & Mcgonagle, 1999). Monetary incentives are considered to operate 
by acting as a replacement for other non-pecuniary motivations for survey participation, such as 
interest in the survey topic, enjoyment of social interaction, or a sense of civic duty (Groves, Singer, & 
Corning, 2000; Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999). A large body of evidence, predominantly based on 
randomized experiments, has established that monetary incentives exert a small to moderate positive 
effect on response rates and that larger incentives tend to produce more substantial effects but with 
diminishing marginal returns (Cantor, O’Hare, and O’Connor 2008; Singer, Groves, and Corning 1999; 
Church, 1993; Singer and Ye, 2013). 
Given the sustained focus on the role of interviewers and monetary incentives in the existing survey 
methodological literature, it is surprising that their potential joint influence has seldom been 
considered.  Because interviewers play such a key role in making contact with and persuading sample 
members to participate, It is prima facie plausible that interviewers vary in how effective they are at 
leveraging incentives to persuade sample members to provide an interview.  For example, some 
interviewers may tailor their doorstep introductions to highlight the availability of a monetary 
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incentive at households that are most likely to be sensitive to them (Campanelli et al., 1997; Groves 
& Couper, 1998).  Similarly, interviewers may feel more confident in their doorstep approach when 
they know an incentive is available which may positively affect their persuasive efforts (Singer & Ye, 
2013) This joint influence is our focus in this paper. We analyse data from three different face-to-face 
interview surveys that included a randomized incentive experiment to identify interviewer influences 
on the effectiveness of monetary incentives in promoting survey cooperation.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first provide short reviews of the respective 
literatures on how interviewers and monetary incentives influence survey response, before setting 
out our expectations regarding the moderating effect of interviewers on the effectiveness of 
incentives. We then describe the three surveys that form the basis of our analysis and the 
administrative data on interviewers and areas to which they are linked. This is followed by an 
exposition of our analysis strategy and presentation of our key findings. We conclude with a 
consideration of the limitations of our study, a discussion of the implications of our findings for 
improving survey practice and suggestions on how future research in this area might usefully proceed.     
 
The effect of interviewers on response rates 
Face-to-face surveys consistently achieve higher response rates than those undertaken by self-
administration or by telephone, a difference that is largely attributable to the role of interviewers. 
Interviewers locate and make repeated calls at sampled addresses, thereby keeping non-contacts to 
a minimum (Campanelli et al., 1997). Having made contact with a household, they undertake a 
number of additional tasks including respondent selection within households, conveying information 
about the survey such as the topic, sponsor, likely duration of the interview, and the availability of 
incentives (Couper & Schlegel, 1998). They also often provide accompanying information about the 
survey, in the form of copies of advanced letters (which will not have been read by all sample 
members), as well as providing reassurance about the bona fides of the survey and showing identity 
documentation (Groves & Couper, 1998; Groves et al., 2000).  
 
Interviewers also persuade reluctant respondents to provide an interview, thereby minimizing 
refusals.  A range of dispositional factors and behavioural styles have been identified as important in 
determining how successful interviewers are at preventing refusals.  These include an ability to 
maintain an interaction, rather than accept a refusal, and to ‘tailor’ their approach on the doorstep to 
specific characteristics of sample units, by identifying and presenting aspects of the survey that they 
judge are likely to be positively valued (Morton-Williams 1993; Campanelli et al 1997; Groves and 
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Couper 1998). For example, an interviewer may remark upon the respondent’s garden if they perceive 
that gardening is likely to be a hobby of the householder, or they might highlight the topic of the 
survey if they judge from the observable characteristics of the sample member that it is likely to be of 
interest. Studies which have examined the causes of non-contact and refusal have consistently found 
significant interviewer effects across a range of sample designs and international contexts (Campanelli 
et al., 1997; Durrant, Groves, & Steele, 2010; Durrant & Steele, 2009; Hox & de Leeuw, 2002). For 
example, Blom, Leeuw, and Hox (2011) found interviewer intra-class correlation coefficients of 0.27 
for non-contact and 0.08 for cooperation across ten countries in the 2008 European Social Survey.  
 
Existing research has also considered which characteristics of interviewers are important in producing 
these effects (Blom & Korbmacher, 2013). This has found that experienced interviewers tend to be 
better at tailoring their approaches to household idiosyncrasies and concerns (Groves and Couper 
1998; Lemay and Durand 2002).  More experienced interviewers, both in terms of experience on the 
particular survey and of interviewing more generally, have also been found to obtain higher response 
rates, even though they are often allocated to more difficult areas (Purdon, Campanelli, & Sturgis, 
1999; West & Blom, 2017). Other studies have found that interviewers with higher levels of self-
confidence and more positive appraisals of the likelihood of achieving interviews also obtain higher 
cooperation rates, an effect which is thought to arise from the positive effect of confidence on the 
quality of doorstep interactions (Singer and Kohnke-Aguirre 1977); Groves and Couper 1998; Hox and 
de Leeuw 2002). The existing evidence, then, suggests that interviewer skills and experience in 
recognising, interpreting, and addressing visual cues and the confidence and self-belief with which 
interviewers approach the task of obtaining cooperation on the doorstep are the key mechanisms 
through which interviewers influence individual cooperation decisions.   
 
Using incentives to increase response rates 
Under the influential ‘Leverage-salience’ theory of survey cooperation (Groves et al., 2000), incentives 
are postulated to work by acting as a replacement for non-financial motivating factors, such as 
engagement in the topic of the survey, enjoyment of social interaction, and a sense of civic or moral 
obligation. Incentives may also invoke norms of reciprocity, such that respondents feel a sense of 
obligation to provide an interview, when they are offered or receive an incentive before the interview 
request is made (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009).  
 
The field of survey research has benefited from a wealth of systematic reviews and meta-analyses of 
the effects of survey incentives which have yielded a robust set of conclusions. We know from this 
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body of evidence that monetary incentives are more effective in motivating participation than non-
monetary incentives such as pens, calendars, diaries and so on (Cantor, O’Hare, and O’Connor 2008; 
Church 1993; Singer and Ye, 2013). It is also well established that pre-paid (or unconditional) 
incentives tend to produce more substantial effects on response rates than those that are promised 
(or conditional) on completion of the survey (Cantor et al., 2008; Church, 1993; Lavrakas, 2008; Singer, 
Hoewyk, et al., 1999),though it does not follow from this that they are necessarily more cost-effective 
(Brick, Montaquila, Hagedorn, Roth, & Chapman, 2005). It is also apparent from these studies that the 
effect of incentives is greater for surveys that have a low response rate when no incentive is offered, 
presumably because there is more scope for the incentive to act as a replacement for non-monetary 
motivations amongst a larger pool of potential nonrespondents(Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999).  
 
Researchers have also established that the magnitude of the effect of incentives on response rates 
increases with the size of the incentive. For instance, in a meta-analysis of 39 experimental studies 
Singer, Groves, and Corning (1999) found that each dollar of incentive paid resulted in one third of a 
percentage point increase in response rate, compared to the no incentive condition. However, other 
studies have found that this ‘dose-response’ relationship is curvilinear, with the size of the increase in 
the response rate declining with additional increases in the value of the monetary incentive(Cantor et 
al., 2008; Gelman, Stevens, & Chan, 2002).  In sum, the existing evidence demonstrates that monetary 
incentives have a robust, positive effect on the probability of survey cooperation.   
 
The joint effect of interviewers and incentives on response rates 
We know, then, that interviewers and incentives have a positive influence on response rates, what 
though of their joint effect? It seems plausible that interviewers might moderate the effect of 
incentives on cooperation probability for three inter-related reasons. First, interviewers are the 
primary conduit of information between survey organisation and sample members and are, therefore, 
essential to ensuring that potential respondents are aware that an incentive is available. While most 
surveys will highlight incentives in an advanced letter, many respondents do not open, let alone read 
them (Stoop, 2005). Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the sorts of people who do not 
read advanced letters – those who are busy and/or uninterested in the survey topic - are also more 
likely to be susceptible to monetary incentives.  Second, interviewers may have more confidence in 
the likelihood of obtaining an interview when a monetary incentive is offered.  This might exert an 
additional positive effect on cooperation over and above the influence of the incentive on 
respondents, because higher levels of confidence improve the quality of interviewer approaches 
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(Groves & Couper, 1996; Singer, Hoewyk, et al., 1999; Singer & Ye, 2013).  Third, interviewers may 
vary in the extent to which they tailor their doorstep introductions by highlighting the availability of 
the incentive at addresses where they believe it is likely to be effective. For example, some 
interviewers might ask sample members whether they received the letter with information about the 
payment at an early stage of the interaction, while others do not mention it at all. 
Existing research, however, offers little in the way of hard evidence on the question of whether or not 
interviewers moderate the effects of monetary incentives on cooperation probability. An exception is 
Singer, Hoewyk, and Maher (2000), who investigated the influence of interviewer expectations on the 
effect of incentives on cooperation rates, using data from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes, a 
telephone survey of the American public.  Singer and colleagues randomly assigned interviewers and 
respondents to three groups: in groups 1 and 2 respondents received an advance letter and a $5 
unconditional incentive, while respondents in group 3 received an advance letter but no incentive.  
Interviewers in group 1 were unaware of the incentive but interviewers in groups 2 and 3 were made 
aware of the incentive level via messages on their computers. Interviewers in groups 1 and 2 achieved 
response rates of 76% and 75%, respectively, compared to 62% for interviewers in group 3. Singer, 
Hoewyk, and Maher (2000) concluded that, although the unconditional incentive boosted response, 
interviewer expectations about the likely cooperativeness of sample members had no additional 
effect. Lynn (2001) found similar evidence from a focus group of interviewers that expectations about 
the likely impact of incentives on cooperation bore little resemblance to actual response outcomes. 
While these studies support the conclusion that incentives operate primarily or exclusively via their 
effects on respondents rather than on interviewers, they do not rule out the possibility that 
interviewers vary in the effectiveness with which they deploy incentives. We turn next to a direct 
empirical assessment of this question.  
 
Data 
We use data from three different UK face-to-face interview surveys. These are the 2015 National 
Survey for Wales Field Test (NSW2015), the 2016 National Survey for Wales Incentive Experiment 
(NSW2016), and Wave 1 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study Innovation Panel (UKHLS-IP). All 
three surveys use stratified random sampling, with addresses selected from the Postcode Address File. 
The two Welsh surveys randomly select one eligible adult (aged 16 and over), while UKHLS-IP attempts 
interviews with all eligible adults (aged 18 and over) in the household.  For UKHLS-IP a cooperating 
household is defined as one in which at least one eligible adult provided an interview. NSW2015 
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randomly allocated 50% of addresses to receive no incentive and 50% to receive £10, NSW2016 also 
used a 50/50 allocation but with a treatment condition of £5 and a control condition of no incentive. 
The UKHSL-IP randomly allocated a third of addresses to receive a £10 incentive and the remainder 
£5. Incentives in all three surveys were offered conditional on completion of the questionnaire and 
allocation of addresses to experimental conditions was implemented within interviewer workloads. 
More detailed information about the design of each survey is provided in the Appendix.  
Each survey was linked to administrative data held on interviewers by the respective survey agencies. 
These were: age, sex, and experience (number of years working for the agency). We use these 
variables to assess whether interviewer characteristics are associated with variability in the 
effectiveness of deploying incentives. For the UKHLS-IP, we also link aggregate census variables from 
the 2011 census to the sample file. A total of 21 census count variables were combined using a factorial 
ecology model (Rees, 1971), with a total of five neighbourhood indices extracted. These measures 
cover the extent of concentrated disadvantage (areas with a higher number of single parent families, 
those on income support and unemployed, fewer people in managerial and professional occupations, 
and less owner occupiers), urbanicity (high population density and domestic properties, and relatively 
little green space) and population mobility (higher levels of in- and out-migration and more single 
person households). We also account for differences in the neighborhood age structure (with higher 
scores for areas with a younger population), housing structure (higher scores for areas with more 
terraced and vacant properties), and the police recorded crime rate. 
Response outcomes for the three surveys are presented in Table 1. The cooperation and response 
rates were higher in the incentive condition for all three surveys, with the UKHLS-IP and NSW2016 
having a 2 percentage point, and the NSW2015 a 5 percentage point higher cooperation rate for the 
incentivised households. The difference is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence (using 
a Chi Square test) for NSW2015 but not for UKHLS-IP or NSW2016. For UKHLS-IP, the response rate is 
4 percentage points higher in the incentive condition, due to a slightly lower rate of non-contacts and 
ineligible addresses in the higher incentive group.  
Table 1, then, demonstrates the cooperation rate was higher in the incentivised condition for all three 
surveys, though the difference was statistically significant in only one. Next we proceed to a 
multivariate analysis to assesses whether these average differences in cooperation rates are constant 
across interviewers, or whether some interviewers are more successful at using the incentive to 








The influence of interviewers on the effectiveness of incentives on survey cooperation is assessed 
using multilevel logistic regression models (Goldstein 2010; Durrant and Steele 2009; Hox and de 
Leeuw 2002). The model applied here has the following form. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑗  denote the binary response for 
household 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑖), interviewed by interviewer 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑗) where 
 
                                                     𝑦𝑖𝑗= {
1
0




𝑦𝑖𝑗  is assumed to follow a Bernoulli distribution, with conditional response probabilities 𝜋𝑖𝑗 =
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1)  and  1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 0) .  The multilevel logistic regression model accounting for 
interviewer effects takes the form 
 
                                               log (
π𝑖j
1−πij
) = β0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗 + 𝐱𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛃 + 𝐳𝑗
′𝛂 + μoj + 𝜇1𝑗        (1) 
 
where 𝑥1𝑖𝑗  is a dummy indicator of the incentive group for household i within the assignment of 
interviewer j, 𝐱𝑖𝑗
′  is a vector of household-level characteristics with coefficient vector 𝛃, 𝐳𝑗
′  is a vector 
of interviewer-level covariates with coefficient vector 𝛂,  𝜇0𝑗  is a random intercept and 𝜇1𝑗   is a 
random coefficient for the incentive dummy. The random intercept and slope variances are assumed 
 NSW2015 NSW2016 UKHLS-IP 
 £10 £0 £5 £0 £10 £5 
Interviews  1,504 1,319 1,801 1,693 1,020 469 
Refusals 591 649 972 978 459 233 
Non-contact 221 224 225 232 65 50 
Other  nonresponse  247 246 207 204 50 44 
Ineligible   402 392 392 367 256 135 
Cooperation Rate 72% 67% 65% 63% 69% 67% 
Response Rate 65% 60% 60% 58% 66% 62% 
Total issued sample 2,965 2,830 3,604 3,467 1,850 931 
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to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and constant variances:  𝜇𝑜𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇0
2 ) , 
 𝜇1𝑗 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇1
2  ).  The random coefficient on the dummy variable for incentive allows an interviewer 
influence on the effect of incentive on cooperation. This random coefficient introduces a covariance 
between 𝜇𝑜𝑗  and 𝜇1𝑗 which is denoted 𝜎𝑢01.  Positive values of 𝜎𝑢01 indicate that the effect of the 
incentive is greater for interviewers with higher response rates, negative values indicate the opposite. 
Cross-level interactions between interviewer characteristic variables and the incentive variable are 
included to test whether observable characteristics of interviewers are associated with variability in 
the effectiveness of deploying incentives.  
 
In standard face-to-face survey designs such as those considered here, identification of interviewer 
effects is complicated by the confounding of interviewer assignments and areas (Campanelli & 
O’Muircheartaigh, 1999; Durrant, Groves, Staetsky, et al., 2010). Failure to account for differences in 
the area-level composition of interviewer assignments can result in over-estimation of the magnitude 
of interviewer effects (O’Muircheartaigh and Campanelli, 1998). Where there is an overlap between 
interviewer assignments and areas, this can be mitigated using a cross-classified multi-level model 
(Durrant and Steele, 2009). However, this could not be done for the three datasets analysed here, 
because it was not possible to obtain geographic identifiers for the two Welsh surveys and the UKHLS-
IP did not contain sufficient crossing of interviewers and areas to implement a cross-classified model. 
We therefore control for area characteristics as fixed effects in the models for the UKHLS-IP data and 
assess the impact this has on the interviewer random effects.  
 
Models are estimated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods using MLwiN software 
(Browne, Kelly, Charlton, & Pillinger, 2016; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004).  The starting values 
for the random parameters are vague priors and second-order penalised quasi-likelihood (PQL) 
estimates for fixed effects. Priors for the variance matrix are assumed to follow an inverse Wishart 
distribution  𝑝(Ω−1)~𝑊𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑛(𝑛, ), where 𝑛 is the number of rows in the variance matrix and is an 
entire estimate for the true value of Ω  (Browne et al., 2016). Because we are using MCMC we also 
assess significance of coefficient estimates using the change in model Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC) (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002). DIC balances model fit and model complexity 
by taking the sum of the posterior expectation (mean) of the deviance function (?̅?) and the effective 
number of parameters (𝑝𝐷). When comparing DIC values, a model with a DIC value of at least 3 points 
lower than the previous model is considered to have a significantly better fit (Rasbash et al., 2012; 





Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates, their standard deviations, and the corresponding 95% 
credible intervals for the NSW2015 and NSW2016 models. As we saw in Table 1, the coefficients for 
the incentive fixed effect are positive for both surveys, although only for NSW2015 does the 95% 
credible interval not include zero. The random coefficient variances of 0.11 and 0.07 are both 
significant, indicating that interviewers vary in the effectiveness with which they deploy incentives. 
The DIC decreases by 14.7 for NSW2015 and by 13.3 for NSW2016 when the interviewer random 
coefficient is introduced, indicating an improvement in model fit.  
The cross-level interactions between the three interviewer characteristic variables – age, sex, and 
experience – and the incentive dummy are all non-significant, indicating that these interviewer 
characteristics do not explain between interviewer variability in the effectiveness of incentives on 
cooperation. The DIC change, when these interaction terms are added, are -2 for NSW2015 and 3.5 
for NSW2016, indicating a small improvement in model fit after the inclusion of these interactions for 
NSW2016. The covariance between the random intercept and random coefficient, 𝜎𝑢01 , is non-
significant for both surveys, with a point estimate of 0.023 for NSW2015 and of -0.031 for NSW2016. 
This indicates that the effectiveness of incentive deployment between interviewers is not related to 
the overall response rate an interviewer achieves on their assignment of addresses.  
 
Figure 1 plots the difference in the mean predicted probability of cooperation for each interviewer 
derived as fitted values from the models in Table 2. Each blue dot in Figure 1 represents an 
interviewer, with the left Y axis being the difference in the response rate for households in the 
incentive and non-incentive conditions. The brown triangles show the overall cooperation rate 
(plotted against the right Y axis) for each interviewer across all eligible households in their assignment. 
There is substantial variability across interviewers in the effectiveness of the incentive in obtaining 
cooperation. For NSW2015, the difference ranges from -9% to +13%, with the corresponding values 
for NSW2016 being -8% and +14%. Not all of this variability is attributable to how skilful interviewers 
are in deploying incentives and simply reflects random variability in response propensities across 
interviewer assignments. We can get a better sense of the effect of interviewers on incentive 
effectiveness by taking the expected response rate for an incentivised household using interviewers 
from the top and bottom deciles of the random coefficient variance, 𝜎1𝑗
2  while holding all other 
variables constant. For NSW2015, this shows that interviewers in the top performing decile achieve 
an expected cooperation rate of 81% for incentivised households compared to 65% for those in the 
bottom decile and compared to 66% for the median interviewer for non-incentivised households, a 
quite substantial difference. 
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients for the final model for NSW2015 and NSW2016 Cooperation) 
  NSW2015 NSW2016 








Intercept  0.244 0.276 -0.281 0.814 0.623 0.264 0.105 1.148 
Incentive {no incentive} £10 Incentive 0.255 0.080 0.099 0.413 0.067 0.317 -0.534 0.678 
Interviewer age {young } Lower middle 0.222 0.201 -0.165 0.625     
 Upper Middle 0.289 0.197 -0.102 0.682 0.189 0.134 -0.074 0.453 
 Old 0.331 0.242 -0.139 0.810     
Interviewer Experience {less } Lower middle 0.089 0.216 -0.342 0.511 0.017 0.262 -0.503 -0.527 
 Upper middle 0.353 0.242 -0.216 0.829 -0.294 0.301 -0.893 0.290 
 Highest 0.431 0.230 -0.024 0.887 -0.364 0.319 -1.000 0.256 
Interviewer Sex {Female} Male -0.060 0.137 -0.330 0.209 -0.155 0.133 -0.376 0.151 
Incentive {£10 per adult}*Gender {Female} £10 per adult *Male -0.020 0.184 -0.376 0.343 -0.281 0.145 -0.566 0.004 
Incentive {£10 per adult} * Age {young} £10* Lower middle -0.089 0.275 -0.634 0.447 0.057 0.315 -0.554 0.649 
 £10* Upper Middle -0.035 0.272 -0.570 0.498 0.584 0.361 -0.125 1.282 
 £10* Old -0.362 0.328 -1.012 0.281 0.065 0.371 -0.671 0.782 
Incentive {£5} * Experience {less} £10*Lower Middle -0.160 0.284 -0.721 0.394 0.057 0.315 -0.554 0.649 
 £10*Upper Middle -0.305 0.317 -0.935 0.323 0.584 0.361 -0.125 1.282 
 £10*Highest 0.024 0.304 -0.575 0.619 0.065 0.371 -0.671 0.782 
𝜎𝑢0
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑜𝑗)   0.156 0.055 0.070 0.285 0.145 0.048 0.0781 0.257 
𝜎𝑢1
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜇1𝑗)   0.109 0.060 0.031 0.260 0.067 0.035 0.021 0.154 
𝜎𝑢01 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇0𝑗, 𝜇1𝑗)   0.023 0.041 -0.069 0.095 -0.031 0.036 -0.115 0.025 
DIC  4799.673 
   
6683.025    
N=4,063 (for NSW 2015)                                   N=5,264 (for NSW 2016) 
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The corresponding figures for NSW2016 are 63% and 77% for the top and bottom deciles, respectively, 
and 63% for the median interviewer for non-incentivised households. There is no obvious relationship 
between the overall response rate and the effectiveness of the incentive within interviewers, so we 
find no evidence that interviewers who are, on average, better at obtaining cooperation are also more 




Figure 1: Difference in predicted probability of cooperation for incentive and non-incentive 
households by interviewer for NSW 2015 (left panel) and NSW 2016 (right panel)  
 
Not all of this variability is attributable to how skilful interviewers are in deploying incentives and 
simply reflects random variability in response propensities across interviewer assignments. We can 
get a better sense of the effect of interviewers on incentive effectiveness by taking the expected 
response rate for an incentivised household using interviewers from the top and bottom deciles of 
the random coefficient variance, 𝜎1𝑗
2  while holding all other variables constant. For NSW2015, this 
shows that interviewers in the top performing decile achieve an expected cooperation rate of 81% for 
incentivised households compared to 65% for those in the bottom decile and compared to 66% for 
the median interviewer for non-incentivised households, a quite substantial difference. The 
corresponding figures for NSW2016 are 63% and 77% for the top and bottom deciles, respectively, 
and 63% for the median interviewer for non-incentivised households. There is no obvious relationship 
between the overall response rate and the effectiveness of the incentive within interviewers, so we 
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find no evidence that interviewers who are, on average, better at obtaining cooperation are also more 
effective in deploying the incentive. 
 
Next we turn to the same analysis of UKHLS-IP, which as a household longitudinal survey, has a rather 
different design to the Welsh cross-sectional surveys, albeit that we focus here on wave 1 only. Table 
3 presents the estimated coefficients, standard deviations, and corresponding 95% credible intervals. 
There are consistent with those presented in Table 2; the fixed effect for the incentive predicting 
cooperation is positive but non-significant and the interviewer characteristics - age, gender, and 
experience - are all non-significant, as are the interactions between these variables and the incentive 
fixed effect.  
 
Two of the area level variables are significantly associated with cooperation; the higher the crime rate, 
the lower the level of survey cooperation, while areas with a housing structure comprising more 
terraced housing and vacant properties have higher levels of cooperation. Even after controlling for 
these differences in area composition, the random coefficient for the incentive is significant, with a 
variance of 0.17 (95% credible interval 0.04 – 0.44). This suggests that the between interviewer 
variability in the effectiveness of the incentive is caused by interviewer behaviour, rather than by 
differences in the sorts of people they have been allocated to interview. The model DIC decreases by 
3.10 with the inclusion of the random coefficient, so, we also find evidence of a between interviewer 
difference in the effectiveness of the incentive on this alternative measure of statistical significance.  
 
As with the Welsh surveys, the covariance between the random intercept and random slope is positive 
but with a 95% credible interval that includes zero. We therefore also find no support from UKHLS-IP 
for the idea that interviewers who, on average, obtain higher cooperation rates might also be more 
effective in their deployment of incentives.  
 
Figure 2 plots the difference in the mean predicted probability of cooperation for each interviewer 
derived as fitted values from the models in Table 3.  It shows a very similar pattern to what we saw in 
Figure 1 for the Welsh surveys, with substantial between-interviewer variation in cooperation 
probabilities between high and low incentive groups with a range of -16% to +23%. Visually, there is 
more evidence of a positive correlation between percentage difference in cooperation probabilities 





Table 3: Estimated coefficients for the final model for Innovation Panel Cooperation 
                                    Posterior 




      
Intercept  0.668 0.538 -0.343 1.803 
Incentive   £10 per adult 0.512 0.569 -0.630 1.643 
Neighbourhood Characteristics       
Housing structure   0.253 0.082 0.095 0.415 
Crime rate   -0.320 0.149 -0.616 -0.034 
Socio-economic disadvantage   0.155 0.092 -0.023 0.338 
Urbanicity  -0.054 0.098 -0.245 0.139 
Population Mobility  0.028 0.094 -0.155 0.213 
Age Profile  0.084 0.069 -0.052 0.220 
Interviewer Characteristics      
Gender {Female} Male -0.204 0.255 -0.710 0.287 
Age {less than 40 years}  41 to 50 years -0.344 0.601 -1.599 0.791 
 50 to 60 years 0.729 0.543 -0.378 1.776 
 > 60 years 0.397 0.558 -0.748 1.485 
Experience {less than 2 yrs.) 3 to 6 years -0.213 0.286 -0.776 0.349 
 7 to 9 years -0.161 0.355 -0.857 0.533 
 >10 years -0.200 0.472 -1.129 0.719 
Incentive * Gender £10 per adult *Male 0.017 0.260 -0.491 0.537 
Incentive  * Age  £10 per adult *41 to 50 
years 
-0.265 0.632 -1.542 0.954 
 £10 per adult *50 to 60 
years 
-0.487 0.576 -1.655 0.645 
 £10 per adult *> 60 years -0.365 0.586 -1.567 0.785 
Incentive * Experience  £10 per adult *3 to 6 years -0.138 0.290 -0.708 0.428 
 £10 per adult *7 to 9 years 0.329 0.373 -0.400 1.060 
 £10 per adult *>10 years  -0.160 0.480 -1.106 0.775 
Random effects      
𝜎0𝑗𝑘
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑜𝑗𝑘)    0.493 0.215 0.179 1.008 
𝜎1𝑘
2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜇1𝑘)    0.154 0.107 0.032 0.430 
𝜇01 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑜𝑘 , 𝜇1𝑘)   0.092 0.113 -0.174 0.280 
DIC  2116.654 





Figure 2: Difference in predicted probability of cooperation for incentive and non-incentive 
households by interviewer for UKHLS-IP 
Discussion 
John Wannamaker, the American department store magnate, once (apocryphally) observed that “half 
the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which half’. The same 
sentiment might also be applied to monetary incentives in surveys, although in this context 
considerably more than half of the money is wasted.  This is because incentives generally add only a 
few percentage points or so to the headline response rate.  It follows, therefore, that the majority of 
respondents in any survey using a monetary incentive would have agreed to provide an interview 
anyway.  A small minority, however, are susceptible to being converted from refusal to interview with 
the provision of an incentive and this, in turn, raises the possibility that interviewers might play an 
important role in determining the rate of such ‘conversions’. While there are, of course, other reasons 
for providing monetary incentives than boosting the response rate, this remains the primary rationale 
in most cases.  It is, therefore, important to understand how best to maximise the effectiveness of 
monetary incentives in converting refusals to interviews. This is all the more pressing, given the likely 




Our findings show that, across three different UK face-to-face surveys, interviewers vary significantly 
in how effective they are at using incentives to increase rates of cooperation. The effects we observe 
are substantively as well as statistically significant; our model estimates show that exchanging 
interviewers from the top to the bottom decile of interviewer performance would yield an expected 
14 to 15 percentage point increase in the effect of the incentive relative to the control condition. We 
have speculated that this heterogeneity results from interviewer expectations and behaviour, 
particularly the use of ‘tailoring’ of doorstep interactions (Groves & Couper, 1998) and greater 
confidence in the probability of obtaining an interview when an incentive is offered (Singer, Frankel, 
& Glassman, 1983; Singer & Maher, 2000). However, while the between interviewer variability in the 
effectiveness of incentives was consistent across the three surveys, we found no significant predictor 
of this variance amongst the covariates considered: interviewer age, sex, and experience. Nor was 
variability in incentive effectiveness related to the overall response rate an interviewer achieved. The 
mechanisms underpinning this effect, therefore, remain unclear.  
Our focus in this paper has been on the effect of incentives on cooperation because incentives seem 
likely to exert their primary influence on the cooperation decision. However, it is possible that they 
also have an effect on contact rates and other categories of nonresponse. We have therefore also 
carried out the analyses reported here with the dependent variable specified as 
response/nonresponse. The results are substantively identical to those reported here, so we find no 
evidence of a differential effect of interviewers on cooperation relative to total nonresponse.1 
Our findings have implications for survey practice.  The approach we have implemented here to 
identify interviewer effectiveness in deploying incentives could be used as a way of identifying 
underperforming interviewers. This sort of monitoring is now implemented routinely in many large-
scale survey operations, often in real-time, as a way of identifying interviewers who show signs of 
missing fieldwork targets (Edwards, Maitland, & O’Connor, 2017; Kreuter, 2013). It should be feasible 
to include ‘incentive performance’ alongside other forms of paradata to raise flags against particular 
interviewers on this performance dimension, although how this would be adapted to designs in which 
all households are offered the same incentive would require further consideration.   
Relatedly, the ability to identify interviewers at the top end of the performance distribution offers 
opportunities for better understanding the sorts of strategies employed by more successful 
interviewers. Information on successful approaches to incentive use that are identified in this way 
could be integrated into sections of interviewer briefings which address doorstep approaches, both 
for generic and survey-specific training.  Indeed, simply highlighting to interviewers that the way they 
                                                          
1 These analyses are available from the corresponding author upon request.  
19 
 
administer incentives can have substantial effects on their response outcomes may, on its own, have 
some effect on their subsequent behaviour.  
While our methodological approach and findings represent an advance in our understanding of how 
interviewers and incentives interact to promote cooperation, this study is not without limitations and 
these should be acknowledged. First, the surveys we have considered all use a relatively narrow range 
of incentive values which are administered to all households in the incentive condition. Caution should 
therefore be exercised in generalising to contexts where larger incentives are used, or where 
incentives of varying values are targeted at different sub-groups of the sample based on response 
propensities (Lavrakas, McPhee, & Jackson, 2016). Our results also have little relevance to the use of 
incentives in online surveys, which comprise a large and growing proportion of total survey volume, 
both in the UK and internationally.  
We were also able to link the sample file and response outcome data to a limited range of area and 
interviewer characteristics. It is, therefore, possible that with stronger controls for differences 
between interviewers in the composition of their allocated addresses the magnitude of the effects we 
have observed here might be reduced. The paucity of interviewer characteristic data available to us, 
particularly the absence of variables measuring interviewer attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours means 
that our ability to explain why some interviewers are more effective in deploying monetary incentives 
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Appendix 1 Descriptions of Survey Sample Designs & Methodology 
National Survey for Wales  Field Test 2015 (NSW 2015) 
The sample design of the NSW2015 used a stratified, single-stage random selection of addresses 
across Wales drawn from the small user Postcode Address File (PAF). Adult aged 16 or over within 
each sampled household were interviewed face-to-face and each interview lasted for an average of 
25 minutes. Where a household contained more than one adult, a single adult was randomly selected.  
The aim of the incentive experiment was to assess the extent to which response rates improved by 
offering respondents a £10 gift-card upon completing an interview.  The  experimental group 
(N=2,960) received a £10 conditional incentive and the second group received no incentive (N=2,828).  
The households which were randomly selected to be offered a conditional £10 received advance 
letters mentioning the incentive, while the other half of households received advance letters that 
contained no information about incentives. To ensure that any differences in response rates between 
respondents who were offered £10 and those offered no incentive are not attributed to any 
interviewer abilities, addresses that were offered incentives were randomly allocated within each 
interviewer assignment. The survey was implemented by a team of 86 interviewers with the number 
of households interviewed by each interviewer ranging between 14 and 134. Further details on the 
NSW2015 sample design can be found in Hanson, Sullivan, and Mcgowan (2015). 
National Survey for Wales Incentive Experiment 2016 (NSW 2016) 
The Welsh Government commissioned the office for National Office of National Statistics (ONS) to 
conduct the National Survey for Wales 2016 (NSW 2016) incentive experiment between July and 
October 2016. The sample was drawn from the Postcode Address File (PAF). The stratification was by 
Local Authority (LA) using an allocation designed to ensure a minimum effective sample size was 
achieved in each LA based on estimated response rate.  Further details on the sample design can be 
found in Aumeyr et al. 2017). Half of addresses in each odd numbered quota2 were offered a £5 
incentive conditional on participation (N=3604), and addresses with even quota number were offered 
no incentive (N=3467). The incentive experiment ran from July to October 2016.  Originally, it was 
intended to run the experiment until December 2016 but it was terminated at the end of October 
2016 as both experimental and control groups experienced lower response rates at 55% and 53% 
respectively which were lower than expected.  With an aim of boosting response rates, a new £10 
incentive conditional on participation was introduced to the full sample from November 2016. This 
                                                          
2 Each quota contained between 20 and 30 addresses on average.  
25 
 
study will only considers the experiment sample size from July to October 2016 that consist of 7,071 
households across the two conditions. There were 85 interviewers working on the survey with the 
minimum and maximum number of interviews per interviewer ranging between 1 and 219. Socio-
demographic characteristics of 10 (12%) interviewers who conducted interviews on 206 (3%) 
households were missing because they did not provide consent. The final analysis sample had 6,106 
households after excluding 965 (13.6%) ineligible households and those interviewed by interviewers 
with missing socio-demographic characteristics.  
UK Household Longitudinal Survey Innovation Panel Wave 1 (UKHLS-IP) 
The sample for the UK Household Longitudinal Survey Innovation Panel  Wave 1 (UKHLS-IP) was 
clustered and stratified, consisting of 2,760 addresses from 120 primary sampling units (PSUs) from 
the Postcode Address File (PAF). The incentive experiment comprised three conditions, with each 
condition receiving a different conditional incentive: Group 1 were offered £5 per adult, Group 2 £10 
per adult, and Group 3 were offered £5 per adult, rising to £10 per adult if all adults in the household 
completed interviews. Single person households randomly assigned to the Group 3 received £5 
initially that increased to £10 if they participated.  For the purposes of our analysis, Groups 2 and 3 
are combined. Note that all households were also sent an unconditional £5 incentive with the advance 
letter. There were 27 households in the UKHLS-IP that did not successfully merge with interviewer 
data due to lack of common unique identifiers. The neighbourhood characteristic variables are drawn 
from the census and were available for England only. This resulted in the exclusion of 344 households 
(13.6%) from Wales and Scotland. In addition, 39 (1.5%) households in 5 MSOAs in England did not 
successfully merge with Innovation Panel data due to lack of common unique identification codes.  
Therefore, the final analysis sample contained 2,113 households. The number of interviewers working 
on the UKHLS-IP was 107, with the number of households interviewed by each interviewer ranging 
between 2 and 50. Further details about the UKHLS-IP can be found in Boreham and Constantine 
2008). 
